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Abstract
We examine the optimal allocation of Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) re-
sources to protect a country’s assets, formulated as a Defender-Attacker-Defender
three-stage sequential, perfect information, zero-sum game between two opponents.
We formulate a trilevel nonlinear integer program for this Defender-Attacker-Defender
model and seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, for which neither the defender
nor the attacker has an incentive to deviate from their respective strategies. Such
a trilevel formulation is not solvable via conventional optimization software and an
exhaustive enumeration of the game tree based on the discrete set of strategies is
intractable for large problem sizes. As such, we test and evaluate variants of a tree
pruning algorithm and a customized heuristic, which we benchmark against an ex-
haustive enumeration. Our tests demonstrate that the pruning strategy is not efficient
enough to scale up to a larger problem. We then demonstrate the scalability of the
heuristic to show that the model can be applied to a realistic size problem.
Key words: game theory, combinatorial optimization, Double Oracle, trilevel, IADS
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A GAME THEORETIC MODEL FOR
THE OPTIMAL DISPOSITION OF
INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM ASSETS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Counterinsurgency has been a primary focus of U.S. military studies due to the
nature of recent conflicts [1]. However, the events such as the Crimean crisis in
Ukraine [2] and the Hamas-Israel conflict in Gaza Strip [3] certainly draw more at-
tention to studies in conventional warfare. Within this research, we seek to examine
an issue within the conventional warfare framework: optimal decision making pertain-
ing to the design and operation of an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Herein,
we consider a sequence of defender and attacker IADS-related decisions within a game
theoretic framework.
Since the advent of the V-2 rockets in the World War II [4], the threat of missiles
has been present in the U.S. military defensive framework. More recently, U.S. allies,
such as Israel and South Korea, face significant threats from their neighboring states.
Since World War II, Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid at $121
billion. Within this aid, the U.S. contributed $2.365 billion to the Arrow anti-missile
program since 1988 [5]. In FY2014 alone, the U.S. and spent $729 million for US-
Israeli Missile Defense budget [6]. Also, South Korea is experiencing increased threats
from North Korea; consider, for example, its recent display of nuclear missile testing
and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle patrols [7].
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We motivate our problem by using Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system as an
example. Iron Dome is a short-range anti-rocket system designed to selectively in-
tercept short-range rocket threats that are in-flight and targeting population centers.
The Iron Dome system consists of a portable missile firing unit, detection radar, and
battle management center [5]. This system was designed by Israel to counter attacks
from either the Gaza Strip or Syria. The question for Israel, then, is where should
they place Iron Dome batteries? Assuming that the main objective of an IADS is
to protect valuable assets (e.g., population or infrastructure), the set of decisions
involves the location of batteries to protect the most valuable targets. This logic is
applicable and will yield the best coverage based on the defender’s valuation of tar-
gets. However, if we assume that Hamas, the attacker, knows the layout of Israel’s
defense, they may attack smaller, unprotected targets that an IADS system with lim-
ited resources cannot protect, or they may attack the most valuable targets that are
protected by the IADS if there is a sufficient likelihood of penetrating the air defense.
The same argument applies for Hamas. If Hamas seeks to maximize the damage
to Israel without consideration of Israel’s defensive resources, they must attack as
many valuable targets as possible. However, with Israel’s air defense system there is
a probability that a rocket attack is ineffective, which increases with improvements
to Israel’s defense.
Herein, we consider a game theoretic study of resource allocation in a strategic
environment, wherein each of two decision makers must allocate resources, and the
other’s strategies affect their own payoffs. In this particular example, the locations
at which Israel places its Iron Dome assets affect Hamas’ strategies and payoffs, and
vice versa. In addition, we apply the concept of Nash equilibrium: a set of respective
strategies from which neither player has an incentive to deviate.
Even though Iron Dome was used as an example, it is only one component of
2
Israel’s IADS. Other components include anti-rocket systems such as David’s Sling,
as well as Arrow I, II, and III intercept missiles, each of which has different flight
characteristics. For the purpose of this initial research on this strategic problem, we
generalize the defensive batteries as Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries that carry
a certain number of interceptor missiles (IM), and we generalize the attacker’s assets
as attacker missiles (AM).
1.2 Problem Statement
Given a set of cities N , each with a value vj, j ∈ N , a limited number of SAM
batteries, and a fixed number of IMs for each SAM site for the defender, and a
fixed number of AMs for the attacker, what are the best respective defender and
attacker strategies to locate and/or allocate their assets? We model this situation
as a two-player, sequential, three-stage, perfect information, zero-sum game. The
term zero-sum indicates that the attacker’s gain in target destruction will equal the
defender’s loss. We model this situation as a sequential game wherein the defender
initially sets up its SAM sites, then the attacker targets certain cities by firing a single
salvo of AMs, upon which the defender launches interceptors against the incoming
AMs. We refer to this framework as a defender-attacker-defender or D-A-D model.
1.3 Assumptions
For the purpose of this research, we make the following initial assumptions:
General Assumptions.
1) All parameters are common knowledge. That is, both players know how many
SAM batteries and IMs the defender has and how many AMs the attacker has.
Given the current state of information availability and intelligence capability, this
3
is a reasonable assumption to make. This assumption makes the game a complete
information game.
2) After each stage, both players know exactly what happened in the previous stage.
This assumption makes the game a perfect information game.
3) Targets are valued equally by both the defender and the attacker. This is a
necessary assumption for a zero-sum game model.
4) An unintercepted AM will destroy a city with 100% probability. This is a simpli-
fying assumption.
Defender Assumptions.
1) A SAM can only be placed at a city. We make this assumption to limit the strategy
space for the defender.
2) At most one SAM battery can be located at a given site. This is a simplifying
assumption.
3) No more than one interceptor will be launched against each incoming AM. This
assumption comes from the fact that the defender will not have time to launch a
second salvo if the IM fails to destroy the AM. Since we are considering missiles
that are subject to be intercepted within a limited radius of coverage, the flight
characteristics of the attacker missiles we are dealing with have a short flight time.
4) Each of the SAM batteries has the same number of interceptors. This is a simpli-
fying assumption.
Attacker Assumptions.
1) An attacker will only launch AMs.
4
2) All AMs have identical destructive capabilities and flight performance. We also
assume that all AM launched can be detected by the defender.
3) An attacker will fire all of its AMs in a single salvo.
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the
current framework of U.S. Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) according to Joint
Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats [8] and reviews relevant research
in the field that influences our examination of the problem. Chapter 3 presents
the methodologies we examine herein to solve the problem. Chapter 4 presents the
results and analysis of our testing on representative instances of varying sizes and
complexities. Chapter 5 summarizes the contributions of this research and proposes
directions for further studies.
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II. Literature Review
This chapter provides a review of relevant doctrine, studies, and models from the
literature. First, we outline the definition of an IADS and its components according
to U.S. military doctrine. Then, we examine game theory and related solution con-
cepts. We also review research concerning security games, the r-Interdiction Median
problem, bilevel formulations, and infrastructures.
2.1 Background
According to Joint Publication 3-01 (JP3-01), Countering Air and Missile Threats,
an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) is defined as “the aggregate of Service/-
functional component air and missile defense (AMD) systems comprising sensors,
weapons, C2, communications, intelligence systems, and personnel...” that follow the
principles of centralized planning, decentralized execution, planned responses, effec-
tive and efficient communications, layered defense, 360-degree coverage, identification
and tracking, alert and warning, and establishing modes of control [8]. Optimization
of an IADS configuration satisfies the planned responses component of the princi-
ples wherein the defender places SAM sites before the attacks occur. JP3-01 also
mentions that while the flight profiles of most ballistic missiles are very predictable,
unpredictable targets require 360-degree coverage, which justifies the generalization
of attacker’s assets as AMs. Also, the publication mentions many different attacker
AM launch platforms (e.g., fighters, bombers, and UAVs) against which the defender
employs its tactics, but we simplify the model to consider a defender having identical
SAM batteries with identical interceptor missiles (IM). Another important distinction
is that there are active AMD and passive AMD measures. Active AMD refers to the
use of aircraft, weapons, and sensors to nullify attacks, whereas passive AMD refers to
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the use of detection, warning, or concealment to increase survivability [8]. The focus
of this research is on active AMD; we seek to maximize the defender’s effectiveness
of intercepting attacks given that the attacker seeks to inflict the maximum damage.
2.2 Game Theory
Game theory is a study of resource allocation in a strategic environment, where
strategic environment implies that your payoff is influenced by others’ action. With
a game theoretic model, we seek to find a reasonable prediction on the actions of
the defender and attacker. The concept of a Nash equilibrium in a strategic game,
developed by John Nash in 1950, identifies that every finite game has an equilibrium
for which no player has an incentive to deviate [9]. Selten [10] proved that any
sequential game tree can be broken into sub-games and, as a result, will also have
a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). For a moderately-sized game-tree, a
SPNE can be found via backward induction.
(18,18)
L
(15,20)
R
L
(20,15)
L
(16,16)
R
M
(18,9)
L
(12,8)
R
R
Figure 1. Small Example Game
For this example of a two-player, two-stage non-zero sum game tree (motivated
from [11]) depicted in Figure 5, we can find the SPNE by examining each sub-game.
The pair (x, y) represents the payoff for each terminal node of the game tree, wherein
x is the payoff for the first mover and y is the payoff for the second mover. By
inspection we observe that the equilibria for each sub-game, from left to right in
Figure 5, is respectively R, R, and L because the second player will seek to achieve
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the higher payoff in each case. Backward induction uses the fact that the second
player will follow such a strategy and, with that information, the first mover will
choose R. Thus, the strategy profile (R,L) is the SPNE.
Backward induction is feasible when the size of the game tree is scalable. Notice
that there are (3)(2) = 6 terminal nodes in the tree displayed in Figure 5, where 3 is
size of the first mover’s strategy space, and 2 is size of the second mover’s strategy
space. For our model, there exist
(|N |
m
)
ways that the defender can place its SAM
batteries, where |N | is the number of cities and m is the number of SAM batteries
available, and there exists
(|N |+n−1
n
)
ways that the attacker can allocate AMs against
cities, where n is the number of total AMs. For example, with an instance having
50 cities, 5 SAM batteries, and 5 AMs, the defender has
(
50
5
)
= 2, 118, 760 ways to
allocate its SAM sites, the attacker has
(
54
5
)
= 3, 162, 510 ways to allocate its AMs,
and the resulting number of nodes at the second level exceeds 6.7× 1012. Because of
the combinatorial expansion of the strategy spaces, we cannot possibly enumerate all
terminal nodes within our IADS problem to apply backward induction. We discuss
this further in Chapter 4.
2.3 Combinatorial Game Theory
Combinatorial game theory is a subset of game theory that typically deals with
two-player perfect-information games that have a finite number of moves [12]. Some
examples of combinatorial games are chess, go, checkers, and tic-tac-toe. In combi-
natorial game theory, each game’s complexity is measured based on average length
of the game and how many decisions each player can make at each stage. In chess,
Claude Shannon [13] estimated that the number of possible moves that each player
can make is in the order of 1043. Such number is defined as the state-complexity
in combinatorial games, and in this model, we can determine the exact number of
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moves of the defender and attacker at each stage based on the number of resources
each player has. One difference from combinatorial games and our model is that the
outcome is not simply win, tie, or loss.
2.4 Tree Search
A substantial number of research endeavors have focused on finding a solution to a
large game-tree. Specifically within the field of artificial intelligence, finding solutions
for computationally intractable games such as chess have been of interest [14]. At each
move in a game of chess, there is a discrete number of moves that a player can make,
and the game tree expands for each move considered. Chess or any two-player board
game is very similar in formulation to our problem in that they are two-player, zero-
sum, perfect information, sequential games. In comparison, the defender-attacker-
defender model is similar to a game of chess that ends in total of three moves.
One method to speed up the search for a SPNE in a large game tree is α − β
pruning, which is similar to the branch-and-bound technique in integer programming.
Knuth et al. [15] outline a technique to speed up the process of exploring a large game-
tree without loss of information. Pearl [16] subsequently proved the optimality of this
solution technique. We use α−β pruning as one of the methodologies to improve the
computation time in finding the SPNE.
2.5 Double Oracle
Another method to address large strategy spaces is the Double Oracle algorithm,
which follows the notion of column and constraint generation in linear programming
as the Double Oracle algorithm solves a subproblem and adds attacker and defender
strategies one by one. McMahan et al. [17] develop and prove convergence and opti-
mality of the Double Oracle algorithm in a two-player, two-stage perfect information
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game. Because of the similarity in formulations, we predominantly reference Jain et
al. [18] for their Double Oracle implementation. Jain et al. [18] use the algorithm to
solve a large-scale combinatorial optimization security game that is further discussed
in the next section.
2.6 Security Games
Security games are used to inform resource allocation decisions concerning in-
frastructure protection and are an important class of Stackelberg games [19]. A
Stackelberg game is a class of sequential game wherein one player optimizes his strat-
egy knowing that the opponent will observe the decision and subsequently select his
optimal strategy. One example of a security game is airport security where there is
a number of vulnerable sites within an airport (i.e., the protected asset), a limited
number of security personnel (i.e., the defender’s resource), and a potential attacker.
Such a framework aligns very closely to our model. Jain et al. [18] use an algorithm
called RUGGED, a double-oracle based algorithm, to solve their model of network
security games. Security games are similar to our D-A-D model because it involves
a defender and an attacker, and they are sequential games by nature. Other similar
examples of Stackelberg games are hider-seeker games [20] and network games [21].
2.7 Maximum Expected Location Covering
Daskin [22] introduces the Maximum Expected Location Covering model (MEX-
CLP), which models a network in which demand nodes must be served by a limited
number of facilities that are co-located with a subset of the demand nodes. De-
pending on the distances involved, a facility may be able to serve demand at nearby
nodes. For example, placing fire stations in a county with multiples towns of different
populations can be modeled using MEXCLP. Using integer programming, MEXCLP
10
maximizes the expected value of demand covered in the network.
The modeling assumptions made in Daskin’s research are similar to our assump-
tions. One of his primary assumptions is binary coverage of a demand by a facility
within a fixed radius; if a demand is within a certain critical distance, the facility
covers the demand. In our model, this assumption is equivalent to stating that if a
city is within the SAM’s defensive envelope, we can consider the city covered by that
SAM battery. That is, the SAM battery may engage incoming AMs targeting the
covered city. Also, MEXCLP utilizes a probability of facility failure, thus the word
expected. The probability of facility failure captures the uncertainty with which the
facility is able to serve demand. In our model, that probability is characterized in
the third level as the single intercept probability of a AM by an IM. Another model-
ing assumption is that redundancy in coverage increase the survivability of a covered
node. In our model’s context, redundant coverage does not mean we launch more
interceptors. Rather, more interceptors would be available to protect the city in case
more AMs are launched against that city. One assumption that is not applicable from
the MEXCLP model is that each facility has an inherent and identical probability
of failure, but we utilize a similar parameter: the probability of failure for an IM
launched by a SAM to intercept a single incoming AM.
2.8 Weapon Target Assignment Problem
Our attacker’s AM allocation problem is motivated by the Weapon Target As-
signment problem (WTAP). The WTAP seeks to assign some discrete number of
weapons to targets so as to minimize the total expected survival value of the targets
after all engagements [23]. WTAP can be formulated as a nonlinear integer program
in which survivability is minimized given some probability of target hit, number of
weapons, and value of each target. Ahuja et al. [23] use a very large-scale neigh-
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borhood (VLSN) search algorithm to solve the WTAP. The WTAP could be applied
to the second-stage of our problem, wherein an attacker seeks to allocate its AMs
in order to minimize the expected survival value of the cities. Ahuja et al. [23]
also provide heuristics which solve the WTAP quickly, albeit sub-optimally, since the
weapon target assignment problem may require quick solutions in its application. For
example, the paper presents one example instance in which there are 200 weapons
and 400 targets and which the heuristic solves in 1.953 seconds.
2.9 Lexicographic Ordering
In order to generate attacker’s strategies, we use a graded lexicographic ordering
index to generate either a single strategy or the entire strategy space. Attacker’s
strategies correspond to multiset or bucketspace in combinatorics where we can put
b distinguishable balls into B distinguishable buckets. Using grlex algorithms from
Equilibrium Blog [24], we can generate all possible attacker strategies given a number
of cities (|N |) and a number of AMs (n). For example, if we wish to generate the
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attacker strategy space for n = 5 and |N | = 6, we would have the following output:

0 0 0 0 0 5
0 0 0 0 1 4
0 0 0 0 2 3
0 0 0 0 3 2
0 0 0 0 4 1
0 0 0 0 5 0
0 0 0 1 0 4
0 0 0 1 1 3
...
4 0 0 1 0 0
4 0 1 0 0 0
4 1 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0

Each row represents a unique attacker strategy, each column corresponds to cities,
and the number in each column corresponds to the number of AMs targeting that
city.
2.10 r-Interdiction
The r-Interdiction Median Problem with Fortification (RIMF) by Church and
Scaparra [25] models a problem that maximizes the defender’s covered demand subject
to an attacker’s subsequent intentional interdiction of r facilities. This formulation is
related to our research as it is a Stackelberg game. The first player is a defender who
fortifies q facilities. The second player is an attacker who destroys r facilities that
are not one of the q facilities. The resulting formulation is an integer-linear program.
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Key assumptions in this paper are that a fortified facility will not be attacked and
that the attacker will succeed in attacks that they mount against any non-fortified
facilities. The authors use properties of the Condensed Balinski Constraints with the
Reduction of Assignment Variables (COBRA) formulation to reduce the number of
variables [25]. In one of the instances addressed utilizing COBRA, the number of
decision variables and constraints were reduced from 11,482 and 18,530 to 923 and
1,568, respectively. The authors also propose heuristics and provide computational
results for their performance.
2.11 Infrastructure
Two infrastructure related papers by Brown et al. [26] and Hausken [27] utilize
bilevel formulation in an attacker-defender setting. These papers offer insights con-
cerning the defense of infrastructures. Brown et al. [26] note that high-fidelity models
are achievable as it is possible to gather data and create models of a complex system.
Also, they found that in general, an attacker has the advantage since a defender must
protect a huge, dispersed target set, whereas the attacker only focuses on a small set
of selected target. Hausken [27] addresses the defense of infrastructures against mul-
tiple attackers. Three ways to value a target are proposed: monetary value, human
value, and symbolic value. Although those could be exchanged in some cases, a target
usually possesses at least one distinct value out of the three mentioned. The author
also notes that the defender and the attacker generally have different values for the
same target, which is not the case for our zero-sum game formulation.
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III. Problem Description
3.1 Model Description
Consider a conflict situation in which a defender seeks to protect a set of cities, N ,
and wherein where each city j ∈ N has a value vj ∈ R+. An attacker seeks to destroy
cities so as to maximize damage, which is equivalent to minimizing the total value
of the defender’s surviving cities. We model the situation as a perfect information,
three-stage sequential, zero-sum game with two players, a defender and an attacker,
with only pure-strategies available for both players.
In the first stage of the game, the defender places m SAM batteries amongst the
set of feasible SAM sites, F ⊆ N . Available SAM sites are co-located with a subset
of the cities. We denote this defender strategy as d = (di)i∈F , where di ∈ {0, 1} and
require
∑
i∈F
di = m. Also, based on a critical distance r ∈ R+, we generate a coverage
matrix A = [aij]|F |×|N | to indicate whether a SAM battery located at city i can cover
city j, based on the Euclidean distance δij > 0 between city i and j, where
aij =

1, if δij ≤ r,
0, otherwise.
In our formulation, a covered city does not denote protection or fortification
against attacker missiles but merely the ability to do so depending on interception
allocations. A city j is considered covered if a SAM gets placed at city i (i.e., di = 1,
and city j is within the range to launch IMs against AMs coming to city j (i.e.,
aij = 1), regardless of the decision made.
In the second stage of the game, the attacker observes the defender’s allocation d
and launches all of its n AMs in a single salvo, implying that no further AMs will be
launched. The attacker’s strategies correspond to AM allocations to each city j ∈ N .
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We denote the attacker’s allocation strategy as w = (wj)j∈N , where wj ∈ Z+, and
require
∑
j∈N
wj = n.
In the third stage of the game, the defender observes the attacker’s AM allocation
w and decides which AMs to intercept with available IMs. Each IM, if allocated,
destroys the targeted AM with a probability p ∈ (0, 1), and we assume that no more
than one interceptor is launched against each AM. We denote the third stage defender
allocation by x = (xij)i∈F,j∈N and y = (yj)j∈N , where xij indicates the number of
interceptors launched from SAM site i ∈ F against AMs targeting city j ∈ N ; we
require that xij ∈ Z+ and
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ c, ∀i ∈ F , where c ∈ Z+ is the number of IMs
that each SAM battery may fire. The binary decision variable yj indicates whether
the city j ∈ N is protected. In order to protect city j, there must be at least as many
IMs launched to protect it (
∑
i∈F
xij), as the AMs attacking it (wj). Moreover, the
defender will not waste any interceptors. Together, this gives the equality constraint∑
i∈F
xij = wj if a city is protected. The number of possible strategies in the third stage
is 2|N |; each city is considered either protected or unprotected (yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N),
but some of the strategies are infeasible because defender cannot protect a city that
is outside of SAM coverage.
The game proceeds in the following manner. The defender allocates its SAM
batteries (d), the attacker deploys AMs (w), and the defender deploys interceptors
against the incoming AMs to decide which cities to defend (x, y). The objective is to
find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of this three-stage defender-attacker-defender
(D-A-D) game.
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Table 1. Parameters
N Set of cities (targets) indexed by j
F Set of possible SAM sites indexed by i, F ⊆ N
A |F | by |N | coverage matrix, aij ∈ {0, 1}
vj Value of city j ∈ N
m Number of SAM batteries available
n Number of AMs available
c Number of IMs available per SAM battery
p Probability of single IM destroying single AM
r Maximum distance of coverage by each SAM battery
Table 2. Decision Variables
di Defender’s SAM allocation at city i ∈ F , di ∈ {0, 1}
wj Attacker’s AM allocation at city j ∈ N , wj ∈ Z+
xij Defender’s IM allocation from SAM site located at city i to city j, xij ∈ Z+
yj Defender’s decision variable to protect city j ∈ N , yj ∈ {0, 1}
max
d
min
w
max
x,y
∑
j∈N
vjyjp
wj (1a)
subject to
∑
i∈F
di = m, (1b)
∑
j∈N
wj = n, (1c)
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ cdi, ∀i ∈ F, (1d)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ N, (1e)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≥ wjyj, ∀j ∈ N, (1f)
di ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, (1g)
wj ∈ Z+, ∀j ∈ N, (1h)
xij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, (1i)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N. (1j)
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The trilevel nonlinear integer program is now presented. Equation (1a) is the
objective function. The defender seeks to maximize the total expected survival value
of its cities while the attacker seeks to minimize the total expected survival value.
Equations (1b), (1c), and (1d) set the upper bounds on the number of SAM batteries,
AMs, and IMs, respectively. Equation (1e) enforces the assumption that the defender
will not launch more than one IM per incoming AM for each city. Equation (1f)
ensures the defender sends enough IMs to intercept incoming AMs. Equations (1g),
(1h), (1i), and (1j) enforce the binary and integrality constraints of the decision
variables.
Based on our assumptions, each city j ∈ N faces three different possibilities:
1) The city has no incoming AMs (i.e., wj = 0). With no incoming AMs, equation
(1f) enforces yj = 1, and the city is considered protected (i.e., yj = 1).
2) The city has incoming AMs and there are not enough IMs to intercept them
all (i.e., wj > 0 and
∑
i∈F
xij < wj). In this case, at least one AM reaches the city
unintercepted and destroys the city with 100% probability as indicated in General
Assumption 2. Equation (1f) forces yj = 0.
3) The city has incoming AMs and there is an IM launched against each AM (i.e.,
wj > 0 and
∑
i∈F
xij ≥ wj). In this case, all incoming AMs to the city are matched up
with an IM and the city is considered protected (i.e., yj = 1).
The possible defender payoffs for each city j based on the three scenario are shown
in Table 3.
Table 3. Possible Scenarios
Scenario yj Defender Payoff
1 1 vj
2 0 0
3 1 vjp
wj
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3.2 Solution Methodology
The following approaches for solving the trilevel program are discussed and suc-
cessively applied during testing in Chapter 4: exhaustive enumeration, α−β pruning,
and Double Oracle.
Method 1: Exhaustive Enumeration
A first approach to solve the trilevel program is to enumerate all possible strategies
in the first two levels and then utilize a commercial solver to optimize the third-stage
integer program and obtain single-stage payoffs for the last level.
In order to index all possible strategy sets, we create index sets that correspond
to the sets of all defender and attacker strategy sets. We denote a defender’s pure
strategy at the first stage as sd ∈ Sd, where sid is the ith strategy in a lexicographically
ordered set of all possible first-stage defender strategies, Sd. Let τd denote the total
number of possible first-stage defender strategies and define Sd = {s1d, . . . , sid, . . . , sτdd }.
Recall that sd 7→ d and that |Sd| = τd =
(|F |
m
)
.
We denote an attacker’s pure strategy at second stage as sa ∈ Sa, where sja is the
jth strategy in a lexicographically ordered set of all possible attacker strategies, Sa.
Sa = {s1a, . . . , sja, . . . , sτaa }. Recall that sa 7→ w and that |Sa| = τa =
(|N |+n−1
n
)
.
Such an index set allows us to model this game within the construct of a game
tree wherein all possible combinations of the defender and attacker pure strategies
in the first two stage are represented as S ≡ Sd × Sa, and the number of possible
defender-attacker combination can be represented as |S| = τdτa =
(|F |
m
)(|N |+n−1
n
)
.
For a particular strategy profile represented by the tuple (sd, sa), we solve the
resulting integer program as presented in (2a) - (2f) to obtain a single payoff for the
defender, which we denote as u(sd, sa), for which sd 7→ d and sa 7→ w.
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Payoff: maximize
x,y
u(d,w) =
∑
j∈N
vjyjp
wj (2a)
subject to
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ cdi, ∀i ∈ F, (2b)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≥ wjyj, ∀j ∈ N, (2c)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ N, (2d)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, (2e)
xij ∈ Z+,∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N. (2f)
Exhaustive enumeration is only tractable for small values of |N |, |F |, and n, since
τd and τa increase combinatorially in size with respect to increases in these parameters
Method 2: α− β Pruning
For a large game tree, there are more efficient ways to search for the maximin
payoff, which corresponds to the SPNE in our formulation. Using α − β pruning,
within an iterative exploration of the game tree, we fathom branches of nodes that
will not yield a better solution than the incumbent solution of best response player
strategies. In our implementation, α represents the lowest value that the maximizer
(defender) may obtain, and β represents the highest value that the minimizer (at-
tacker) may obtain. We set the initial values as α = 0 and β =
∑
j∈N
vj, since the worst
case scenario for the defender is when no city is protected (objective value= 0), and
the worst case scenario for the attacker is when all cities are protected and no AMs
are launched (objective value =
∑
j∈N
vj).
To investigate the impact of search order on computation time, we execute the
α − β pruning algorithm four times, each of which considers a different combina-
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tion of strategy search ordering at the respective defender and attacker stages of
the game tree. In other words, we search the game tree S in two different orders
at both stages. For example, we search the game tree S in the following manner:
(s1d, s
1
a), (s
1
d, s
2
a), . . . , (s
1
d, s
τa
a ), (s
2
d, s
1
a), . . . , (s
τd
d , s
τa
a ), where each terminal node is repre-
sented by the tuple (sd, sa). This particular method is denoted as αβ11, since we
begin the search at s1d, s
1
a.
Because the cities’ values can be ordered and the strategies are ordered lexico-
graphically, the order in which we search the tree may impact algorithm computation
time. The earlier we find the best value for the attacker (i.e., βˆ ≤ αˆ), the more
branches we prune off in the tree search, saving computation time. Thus, it is in our
interest to order the strategies that yields such a result.
The pseudocode for the defender-attacker α − β pruning algorithm is shown in
Algorithm 1. Shown at the end of the algorithm, sˆd and sˆa correspond to the SPNE
defender and attacker strategy. Because we know that the α − β pruning algorithm
returns the SPNE of the game tree, we can conclude that αˆ = α∗, sˆd = s∗d, and
sˆa = s
∗
a. Note that αˆ = u(sˆd, sˆa) corresponds to the SPNE payoff for the defender.
The attacker’s SPNE payoff is simply −u(sˆd, sˆa) as this is a zero-sum game.
Method 3: Double Oracle
In our implementation of Double Oracle, developed by McMahan et al. [17], we
solve a trilevel optimization problem using three interrelated algorithmic procedures:
coreTree, Defender Oracle, and Attacker Oracle.
The first component is coreTree, wherein we solve the restricted game. In the
restricted game, we consider only the set of defender and attacker strategies, Skd and
Ska , currently identified at step k using backward induction. The resulting strategy
profile (sˆd, sˆa) is a Nash equilibrium for this restrict game, where sˆd ∈ Skd , sˆa ∈ Ska ,
and Sk = Skd × Ska . The second component is the Defender Oracle sub-problem,
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Algorithm 1 α− β pruning for D-A-D
1: αˆ := 0
2: for i = 1 to τd do
3: βˆ :=
∑
j∈N vj
4: for j = 1 to τa do
5: βˆ ← min(βˆ, u(sid, sja))
6: if βˆ ≤ αˆ then
7: sˆa ← sja
8: break
9: end
10: end
11: αˆ← max(αˆ, βˆ)
12: if βˆ ≥ αˆ then
13: sˆd ← sid
14: end
15: end
16: return αˆ, sˆd, sˆa
wherein we identify the defender’s best response (s¯d ∈ Sd) given an attacker’s current
best response (sˆa) from the coreTree. The third component is the Attacker Oracle
sub-problem, wherein we solve for the attacker’s best response (s¯a ∈ Sa) given a
defender’s current best response (sˆd) from the coreTree. Because of the nature of
our methodology, the Double Oracle procedure is a heuristic. The difference between
the Double Oracle implementation by Jain et al. [18] and this research is that we
do not generate mixed strategies from the core problem. Rather, we identify the
pure-strategy SPNE of the smaller game using backward induction within the trees
generated from the current strategy set. The pseudocode for a defender-attacker
Double Oracle is shown in Algorithm 2.
Defender Oracle Problem.
Given an attacker’s AM allocation, the Defender Oracle solves for the best allo-
cation of SAM batteries and IM launches. For the defender, sid is a best response to
the attacker strategy sa if u(s
i
d, sa) ≥ u(si′d , sa) for all si′d ∈ Sd. It is possible to have
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Algorithm 2 Double Oracle
1: Initialize S0d by generating an arbitrary set of defender strategies.
2: Initialize S0a by generating an arbitrary set of attacker strategies.
3: k := 0
4: repeat
5: k ← k + 1
6: (sˆd, sˆa) ← coreTree(Sk−1d , Sk−1a )
7: s¯d ← DefenderO (sˆa)
8: Skd ← Sk−1d ∪ s¯d
9: s¯a ← AttackerO (sˆd)
10: Ska ← Sk−1a ∪ s¯a
11: until Skd = S
k−1
d and S
k
a = S
k−1
a
12: return sˆd, sˆa
multiple best responses, but we only consider pure strategies. Thus, we choose the
first strategy identified. The Defender Oracle sub-problem can be modeled as a linear
integer program. We can draw the parallel to MEXCLP from this problem, as De-
fender Oracle problem seeks to allocate facilities to maximize their expected coverage
value. However, probability of failure is not characterized by the facility. Rather, it is
a function of AM allocations by the attacker. Because this is a linear integer program
and we can find find the exact solution, we have that u(s¯d, sˆa) ≥ u(sid, sˆa), ∀sid ∈ Sd
holds.
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DefenderO: maximize
d,x,y
∑
j∈N
vjyjp
wj (3a)
subject to
∑
i∈F
di = m, (3b)
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ cdi, ∀i ∈ F, (3c)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≥ wjyj, ∀j ∈ N, (3d)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ N, (3e)
di ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, (3f)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, (3g)
xij ∈ Z+,∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N. (3h)
Attacker Oracle Problem.
Given a defender’s SAM allocations, the Attacker Oracle sub-problem solves for
the best allocation of AMs, subject to a defender’s subsequent response by launching
a fixed number of IMs to intercept them from a set of SAM batteries at predetermined
locations. In other words, we seek to find some sia that satisfies u(sd, s
i
a) ≤ u(sd, si′a )
for all si
′
a ∈ Sa. This problem can be modeled as a bilevel nonlinear integer program,
and we utilize a heuristic to obtain a solution. This problem is similar to WTAP [23],
as we seek optimal weapon target assignments, but the probability of destruction, p, is
not a characteristic of the attacker’s AM. Rather, it is a characteristic of the defender’s
IM. Because we utilize heuristics, we have that u(sˆd, s¯a) ≤ u(sˆd, sia), ∀sia ∈ Sa does
not necessarily hold.
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AttackerO: minimize
w
maximize
x,y
∑
j∈N
vjyjp
wj (4a)
subject to
∑
j∈N
wj ≤ n, (4b)
∑
j∈N
xij ≤ cdi, ∀i ∈ F, (4c)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≥ wjyj, ∀j ∈ N, (4d)
∑
i∈F
aijxij ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ N, (4e)
wj ∈ Z+,∀j ∈ N, (4f)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, (4g)
xij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N. (4h)
In order to solve the Attacker Oracle sub-problem, we utilize a neighborhood
search as shown in Algorithm 3. We give an initial feasible strategy, after which
we iteratively generate neighboring strategies and move to the best such neighboring
strategies. We use the notion of 2-opt exchange when generating our neighboring
strategies. In this context, a neighborhood of a given attacker strategy is a set of
all strategies that has exactly one AM moved from any city j ∈ N to some city
j′ ∈ N, j 6= j′. For example, if a given initial strategy is [0 4 3], where 4 AMs
are allocated to city 2 and 3 AMs to city 3 in a 3-city network, the neighborhood
of solutions generated from such an attacker strategy for a possible 2-opt exchange
would be as follows:
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neighbors([0 4 3]) =

0 4 3
1 3 3
0 3 4
1 4 2
0 5 2

.
This neighborhood search heuristic terminates when the incumbent feasible strat-
egy gives the best payoff relative to its own neighborhood (i.e., s¯a = B(1)). For
the Attacker Oracle, the search terminates for an initial strategy sia if u(sˆd, s
i
a) <
u(sˆd, s
i′
a ), ∀si′a ∈ B, where B is the set of neighborhood strategies generated.
Algorithm 3 Attacker Oracle
1: s¯a ← s1a
2: u¯ :=∞
3: repeat
4: B← neighbors(s¯a)
5: for i = 1 to |B| do
6: if u(sˆd,B(i)) < u¯ then
7: s¯a ← B(i)
8: u¯← u(sˆd,B(i))
9: end
10: end
11: until s¯a = B(1)
12: return s¯a
In the following chapter, we present an example network instance to compare the
solution quality, algorithm quality, and robustness of the methodologies presented
in this chapter using an experimental design to examine the effect of parameters on
computation time and payoffs. In addition, we provide a scale up analysis of Double
Oracle for problems that are infeasible to solve using exhaustive enumeration or the
α− β pruning algorithm.
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IV. Computational Results
In this chapter, we present a small network to apply our proposed solution method-
ologies in the previous chapter. We conduct experiments on different problem in-
stances on the small network and present the findings. Subsequently, we present
a network that is too large for all but Double Oracle to be applied and show the
performance of Double Oracle.
4.1 Analysis on 6-city Network
We first examine the 6-city network used in Daskin’s MEXCLP [22], as shown
in Figure 2, with the same parameters and assumptions: F = N and r = 9. We
examine the 6-city network first because it is a small enough network to implement
all methodologies proposed in the previous chapter.
Because exhaustive enumeration and α − β are computationally expensive, we
generate problem instances via a Central Composite Design (CCD) having the values
shown in Table 4. Excluding the repeated center runs, we solve a total of 25 problem
instances and investigate the effect of the number of SAM batteries (m), number
of AMs (n), number of IMs (c), and the probability of single intercept (p), on the
required computation time and the solution quality. For each problem instance, we
apply six solution methodologies: exhaustive enumeration, α− β pruning using each
of four different search order combinations for the respective defender and attacker
levels of the game tree, and Double Oracle. All instances were solved by invoking
IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio (version 12.6) with MATLAB on a Intel(R)
Xeon E5-1620 3.6 GHz processor having 32 GB memory.
The resulting computation times are reported in Table 5. Columns m,n, c, p
represent a combination of defender and attacker capabilities that comprise each
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Table 4. Central Composite Design
m n c p
High 4 20 16 .7
Low 2 10 8 .3
instance, represented in a given row. The first sub-column of computation time
represents the time required to fully enumerate the game tree and identify the SPNE.
In successive sub-columns, four variations of α−β search represent the order in which
the tree was searched (See Method 2 in Chapter III for an explanation). Finally, the
DoubleO column reports the computation time required for the heuristic to terminate.
An asterisk (*) indicates that Double Oracle terminated before identifying the SPNE.
A B
C
D E
F
1 1
1
5 310
10
8
4
8
4
11 11
10
7 7
1 Value at city j, vj
δ Distance between i and j, δij
A
City j
Figure 2. 6-city Network
Solution Quality
Both exhaustive enumeration and the α− β variants are exact algorithms. Based
on the effects test using the result of Table 5, Table 6 shows that all four parameters
comprising a problem instance (i.e., m,n, c, p) have a statistically significant effect
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Table 5. Computation time on 6-city Network
Problem Instance Computation time (sec)
m n c p full αβ11 αβ12 αβ21 αβ22 DoubleO
3 5 12 0.5 9.75 0.77 8.78 1.25 8.32 0.41
2 10 8 0.3 88.58 35.25 42.78 35.07 42.15 1.35
2 10 8 0.7 88.33 19.35 50.09 18.28 44.16 1.55*
2 10 16 0.3 87.50 34.74 42.35 34.61 41.67 1.44
2 10 16 0.7 86.40 18.24 53.18 17.73 46.82 1.71
4 10 8 0.7 93.69 7.06 94.20 7.12 94.28 0.84
4 10 8 0.3 105.84 48.00 58.03 52.39 66.90 1.09
4 10 16 0.3 101.55 45.78 62.05 46.36 63.24 0.99
4 10 16 0.7 89.98 6.74 91.57 6.75 91.16 1.30
1 15 12 0.5 190.55 79.39 142.41 140.60 53.74 3.92*
5 15 12 0.5 203.29 83.19 155.41 83.40 155.57 2.16
3 15 4 0.5 1288.50 466.71 727.49 486.80 655.39 5.59*
3 15 12 0.1 796.86 454.52 383.54 455.20 380.27 1.77
3 15 12 0.5 924.61 262.38 634.65 276.23 604.69 1.40
3 15 12 0.9 764.09 63.60 758.64 99.63 553.48 3.91
3 15 20 0.5 773.12 226.12 523.28 226.56 508.31 1.63
2 20 8 0.3 3688.33 2263.86 1331.19 1942.82 1496.63 5.41
2 20 8 0.7 3189.35 921.37 1751.27 795.94 1697.74 8.72
2 20 16 0.3 2928.64 1835.90 789.69 1429.54 1165.64 2.92
2 20 16 0.7 2481.01 914.47 867.86 365.81 1433.88 3.14
4 20 8 0.3 3792.72 2360.05 1691.40 2390.64 1698.26 1.12
4 20 8 0.7 3689.57 652.39 3682.91 934.97 3196.53 2.25
4 20 16 0.3 3136.53 2006.02 1370.78 1991.22 1378.16 2.08
4 20 16 0.7 3101.86 665.69 3018.79 668.44 3023.00 2.52
3 25 12 0.5 24757.28 10955.51 12599.12 10979.81 12376.85 5.44
* indicates that Double Oracle terminated before identifying the SPNE.
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on the SPNE payoff. On the other hand, Double Oracle is a heuristic, so it cannot
guarantee to find the SPNE before it terminates. As shown in Table 5 under the
DoubleO column, 3 out of 25 instances (12%) fail to reach the SPNE and provide
a suboptimal solution. In all three instances, the reported payoff was less than the
SPNE payoff. Such results indicate that the defender (maximizer) failed to generate
correct strategies. Conversely, a reported payoff larger than the SPNE payoff indicates
that the attacker (minimizer) failed to reach the global minimum in the Attacker
Oracle procedure.
Table 6. Effects Test on Payoff
Variable F Ratio p-Value
m 22.4804 < 0.0001
n 95.2264 < 0.0001
c 13.9343 < 0.0001
p 805.5464 < 0.0001
Table 7. Double Oracle Suboptimal Instances
Problem Instance Payoff
m n c p SPNE DoubleO % Gap
2 10 8 0.7 7.676 7.216 6.0%
1 15 12 0.5 1.000 0.719 28.1%
3 15 4 0.5 2.188 1.313 40.0%
Algorithm Quality
In this section, we discuss how efficiently each algorithm converges to the SPNE.
We primarily examine computation times, since exhaustive enumeration and α − β
are guaranteed to converge to the SPNE. Also, we compare exhaustive enumeration
and α−β with Double Oracle in terms of computation time to show how well Double
Oracle scales in larger instances.
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Table 8. Computational Efficiency
Method Average % of S pruned
αβ11 64.4%
αβ12 41.4%
αβ21 64.1%
αβ22 38.5%
Comparison of Search Order in α− β
The order in which we search the respective levels of the game tree appears to
exhibit a difference on the required computation time. On average, αβ11 obtains the
fastest computation time or, equivalently stated, αβ11 needed to compute payoffs
(i.e., Equation 2) the least before terminating. Such a result is intuitive, as we expect
to find the SPNE near the top of the lexicographically ordered strategies (i.e., the
defender covers its most valuable cities, and the attacker attacks the most valued
cities).
Table 8 shows the proportion of the entire strategy space, S, generated before
convergence for the 25 CCD instances. Detailed results are shown in Table 9.
Robustness of the Algorithms
While Double Oracle failed to identify the SPNE in 3 out of 25 instances, the
algorithm does scale well with respect to computation time. For the largest problem
instance of m = 3, n = 25, c = 12, p = 0.5, the exhaustive enumeration proce-
dure required |S| = τdτa =
(
6
3
)(
6+25−1
25
)
= 2850120 combinations of defender-attacker
strategies to calculate and terminated after about 7 hours of computation time. The
best case α− β algorithmic variant, αβ11, found the SPNE in 10955 seconds (≈ 3.04
hours). In contrast, Double Oracle terminated in 5.44 seconds after identifying the
SPNE. Although α − β pruning invokes the stage 3 calculation of payoff functions
significantly fewer times in the game tree than the exhaustive enumeration procedure,
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Table 9. % of S generated on 6-city Network
Problem Instance % generated
m n c p full αβ11 αβ12 αβ21 αβ22 DoubleO
3 5 12 0.5 100% 7.94% 84.96% 12.84% 89.60% 0.179%
2 10 8 0.3 100% 39.86% 47.49% 39.67% 48.21% 0.027%
2 10 8 0.7 100% 21.91% 49.65% 20.95% 56.41% 0.027%*
2 10 16 0.3 100% 39.86% 47.49% 39.67% 48.21% 0.027%
2 10 16 0.7 100% 21.31% 53.82% 20.71% 60.82% 0.036%
4 10 8 0.3 100% 46.57% 60.12% 46.57% 60.12% 0.013%
4 10 8 0.7 100% 7.69% 99.01% 7.69% 99.01% 0.013%
4 10 16 0.3 100% 46.57% 60.12% 46.57% 60.12% 0.013%
4 10 16 0.7 100% 7.69% 99.01% 7.69% 99.01% 0.013%
1 15 12 0.5 100% 42.74% 29.56% 71.30% 72.11% 0.026%*
5 15 12 0.5 100% 41.99% 74.68% 41.99% 74.68% 0.006%
3 15 4 0.5 100% 37.67% 48.68% 39.34% 54.65% 0.003%*
3 15 12 0.5 100% 31.66% 61.18% 31.88% 62.53% 0.003%
3 15 12 0.9 100% 10.16% 64.97% 15.21% 82.16% 0.005%
3 15 20 0.5 100% 31.66% 61.18% 31.88% 62.53% 0.003%
2 20 8 0.3 100% 57.47% 44.72% 49.09% 37.92% 0.003%
2 20 8 0.7 100% 31.95% 48.92% 27.69% 49.63% 0.004%
2 20 16 0.3 100% 54.59% 37.91% 49.23% 33.27% 0.001%
2 20 16 0.7 100% 36.56% 49.23% 18.11% 34.86% 0.002%
4 20 8 0.3 100% 59.51% 47.16% 59.51% 47.16% 0.001%
4 20 8 0.7 100% 23.89% 72.69% 31.04% 79.74% 0.001%
4 20 16 0.3 100% 59.51% 47.16% 59.51% 47.16% 0.001%
4 20 16 0.7 100% 28.54% 78.12% 28.54% 78.12% 0.001%
3 25 12 0.5 100% 45.45% 48.85% 45.51% 49.48% 0.001%
* indicates that Double Oracle terminated before identifying the SPNE.
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the method does not scale well for large instances.
In fact, neither exhaustive enumeration nor α − β scale well to larger instances.
Because the required computation time for the exhaustive enumeration and α−β so-
lution methods are directly related to the size of the Cartesian product of the defender
and attacker strategies (i.e., |S|), as n and/or |N | increases, the time required to iden-
tify the SPNE grows in relation to the problem’s size. For an instance having m = 3,
n = 25, c = 12, and p = 0.5, we have |S| = 2850120 via exhaustive enumeration,
as calculated previously. As n increases to 35 and 45, |S| increases to approximately
13.1 million and 42.4 million, respectively. However, Double Oracle can still handle
such instances with little computational effort. Double Oracle terminated after 10.95
seconds for n = 35 and after 18.01 seconds for n = 45.
4.2 Scaled Up Analysis
This section presents the result of experiments using Double Oracle on the 55-city
network utilized by Daskin [22], as shown in Figure 3. The cities are distributed on
a Cartesian plain, and their values are monotonically non-increasing in order (i.e.,
vi ≥ vj,∀ i < j). The total value of the cities,
∑
j∈N
vj, is 6400. We apply the same
assumptions (i.e., F = N and r = 15) as Daskin’s MEXCLP, and we use c = 20 and
p = 0.9 as representative for our instance, based on the operating characteristics of
Iron Dome [28].
Exhaustive enumeration and α− β are not practical to use for this network size,
since τd and τa are intractably large. Even for the smallest instance we examine in the
55-city network (i.e., m = 1, n = 10, and |N | = 55), we find that τd =
(
55
1
)
and τa =(
55+10−1
10
)
, thus |S| = τdτa ≈ 8.33 × 1012. Each payoff calculation was approximately
2 × 10−3s, which means CPLEX processes about 1000 stage 3 calculations in every
2 seconds. Assuming equal calculation time, the exhaustive enumeration would take
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(8.33 × 1012)(2 × 10−3)s ≈ 1.67 × 1010s ≈ 528 years. Thus, we cannot verify the
optimality of the results of Double Oracle through exhaustive enumeration or α − β
for large instances.
Table 10. Computation time (s) on 55-city Network with c = 20 and p = 0.9.
Number of SAM batteries (m)
1 3 6 10
Number
of
AMs(n)
10 23.83 18.49 22.17 15.00
20 75.83 59.90 51.18 40.20
30 120.21 98.37 206.75 130.88
40 274.42 212.91 213.01 189.07
50 470.88 365.37 240.97 261.47
Table 11. Approximate SPNE Payoffs on 55-city Network with c = 20 and p = 0.9.
Number of SAM batteries (m)
1 3 6 10
Number
of
AMs(n)
10 5400.00 5831.41 5553.10 5834.83
20 4763.79 5190.84 5414.11 5435.66
30 4165.66 5051.60 5077.03 5119.18
40 3585.66 4705.86 4862.84 4862.84
50 3281.05 4427.80 4749.59 4652.31
Total value of the cities in this network is 6400.
Table 10 shows the computation time before Double Oracle terminates with vary-
ing n and m. Table 11 shows the payoffs for the defender with varying n and m.
Notice that defender’s payoff sometimes decreases as it gets more resources. For ex-
ample, at n = 10, the defender gets payoff of 5831.41 with m = 3, but 5751.63 with
m = 6. Such phenomenon could be attributed to the Double Oracle failing to identify
the SPNE, being a heuristic.
Example Result
Shown in Figure 5 and 6 are example result of a Double Oracle executed on a
specific instance. The interpretation of the plot is that after the three stages, we
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expect to see what is shown in the plot. For Figure 5, in the first stage, we expect
the defender to place SAM at city 1; in the second stage, we expect the attacker to
launch AMs at cities with red circles; in the third stage we expect the defender launch
interceptors to protect cities 1,2,3, and 4. Also, if we assume that the outcome is the
SPNE, then we can assume that one who deviates from the displayed outcome will
achieve less payoff than the current outcome.
Sensitivity Analysis
Shown in Figure 7 is a sensitivity of payoff in changing p. The monotonic increase
in payoff as p increases is consistent with what we expect. Also, we expect smaller
payoff with larger n, and such trend is only violated past p = 0.9.
Figure 8 shows the increase in computation time as n increases, but except for
n = 50, trend of computation time as p changes does not seem to exist. Also, unlike
exhaustive enumeration and α−β, computation time does not increase exponentially
as n increases for Double Oracle.
Figure 9 and 10 show a side-by-side comparison of the expected outcome if the
city distribution is reversed.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
Advanced technologies for missiles and guidance systems have increased the threat
to the U.S. national security. Optimal disposition of IADS assets is an important
problem for the U.S military and its allies for that reason. In this thesis, we present a
trilevel nonlinear integer program to model the Defender-Attacker-Defender situation
as a two player, three-stage sequential, perfect and complete information, zero-sum
game. We initially attempt to solve by enumerating all possible strategies as a game
tree. However, the size of the strategy space increase to intractable size because this
is a combinatorial problem. We attempt to be more efficient by using α− β pruning,
but α − β does not scale well. Then, we adapt Double Oracle algorithm to solve
for the pure strategy SPNE in order to solve problems that are realistic in size. We
present algorithm quality, solution quality, and sensitivity analysis.
In conclusion, we found that Double Oracle is the only methodology that can
provide the solution quickly. We also demonstrated that the time to solve a Double
Oracle instance does not increase exponentially as do exhaustive enumeration and
α − β. While Double Oracle is not an exact algorithm in our adaptation, we show
that in most cases, it does not violate monotonicity and the solution quality trends
as we expected.
5.2 Potential Future Research
Relaxing Assumptions
Many of the model assumptions in this thesis can be relaxed and examined for
future research. General assumption 1 states that all parameters are common knowl-
edge. Relaxing this assumption requires the game model to have imperfect informa-
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tion, which is more computationally expensive. General assumption 2 states that the
defender and attacker value targets equally. Relaxing this assumption will make the
game non-zero-sum.
Defender assumption 1 states that a SAM battery can only be co-located with a
city. Relaxing this assumption will make the defender’s strategy space continuous,
which would make the model more realistic, but it would be computationally expen-
sive. Defender assumption 2 states that at most one SAM battery can be located at
a given site. Relaxing this assumption will increase the number of possible defender
strategies from
(|F |
m
)
to
(|F |+m−1
m
)
, but given Double Oracle’s performance, increased
strategy space should not be an issue computationally. Defender assumption 3 states
that only one interceptor will be launched against incoming AM. This assumption was
put in place assuming that the defender will not have time to observe and react to
failed interception. However, relaxing this assumption will allow the defender to pro-
tect cities with large values with more redundancy. In order to relax this assumption,
a penalty function for over-launching IM must be implemented.
Attacker assumption 2 states that all missiles are identical. This assumption
may not be true, as different attacker missiles have different flying characteristics. If
relaxed, the probability of a single intercept, p, will become a vector that represents
the characteristics of different AMs. Attacker assumption 3 states that an attacker
will fire all of its AMs in a single salvo. If relaxed, the attacker stage becomes
dynamic, and the attacker oracle will resemble a dynamic weapon target assignment,
as opposed to the static weapon target assignment. This would make the problem
more difficult and Double Oracle may not be applicable anymore, but the model
would be more realistic. Simulation may be a good tool to implement the relaxation
of attacker assumption 3.
Improvement on Tree Search Algorithm
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Besides α−β, there are many other tree-search algorithms that have been proven
to perform better in artificial intelligence field. Some of the examples include SSS*
[29], NegaScout [30], and MTD(f) [31]. For the purpose of further research in this
topic, we do not recommend examining tree-search algorithms. As we have a finite
and known game tree (defender-attacker-defender) depth, there are more efficient
algorithms to implement, such as Double Oracle.
Improvement on Double Oracle
Our current implementation of Double Oracle as developed by Jain et al. [18]
can be improved in several ways. Not generating mixed strategies for coreTree may
have an impact on identifying the SPNE before the algorithm terminates. Also,
one could consider generating multiple best-response functions via the Defender and
Attacker Oracle routines. Also, the Attacker Oracle heuristic can be improved upon
with regard to its neighborhood search. A closer examination of VLSN techniques by
Ahuja et al. [32] would help in that case. Finally, one could examine an improved
version of the Double Oracle solution method developed by Jain et al. [33]: Securing
Networks by Applying a Randomized Emplacement Strategy (SNARES).
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